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WHO CONSTRAINS PRESIDENTIAL EXERCISE OF
DELEGATED POWERS?
Rebecca L. Brown*

I have an Article II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as
President.
—President Donald J. Trump1
Until now, for the most part, the death of the nondelegation doctrine has been
discussed mostly in the context of delegations to administrative agencies.2 For reasons
that sometimes appear partisan or policy-driven, arguments about the nondelegation
doctrine have often focused on whether administrative agencies are a good thing for
our democracy.3 Those who tend to favor regulation in the name of broad social
objectives like environmental protection or consumer safety have tended to support
the laxity of the nondelegation doctrine in the pursuit of robust administrative missions
in the common good.4 Those who worry about fairness to regulated parties and
overreach of government into the marketplace have, symmetrically, tended to lament
the demise of the nondelegation doctrine and the correlative regulatory freedom that
it has engendered for administrative agencies.5 This dance has illuminated two
versions of liberty and two versions of the general welfare for an entire generation
of law scholarship, with the nondelegation doctrine under a central spotlight.
* The Rader Family Trustee Chair in Law, USC Gould School of Law. My thanks go to
Lisa Bressman, Bob Rasmussen, and Sam Erman for their helpful discussions about this topic
and to Emily True for her inspiring research assistance.
1
Remarks at Turning Point U.S.A.’s Teen Student Action Summit 2019, 2019 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 504 (July 23, 2019); see also Michael Brice-Saddler, While Bemoaning
Mueller Probe, Trump Falsely Says the Constitution Gives Him ‘the Right to Do Whatever
I Want,’ WASH. POST (July 23, 2019, 9:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/2019/07/23/trump-falsely-tells-auditorium-full-teens-constitution-gives-him-right-do-what
ever-I-want/ [https://perma.cc/6SXL-WWQQ] (discussing the context of the President’s
remarks and the scope of the Article II grant of executive power).
2
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
354–57 (6th ed. 2019); 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 3:2–3:3
(2d ed. 1978); LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 57–72 (1965).
3
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 81, 95–99 (1985) (arguing that delegation to administrative
agencies facilitates responsiveness to changes in voter preferences); DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 14, 99–106 (1993) (arguing that delegation to administrative agencies short-circuits
democratic accountability).
4
See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 3, at 91–99; 1 DAVIS, supra note 2, § 3:3.
5
See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 3, at 85; SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 49–57.

591

592

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29:591

But it is not just about agencies anymore. The time has come for all sides of that
debate to rally around a specific concern about delegation that has been insufficiently
scrutinized. This Article looks specifically at one kind of delegation, the direct delegation to the President alone. It sounds the alarm about a recent confluence of judicial,
legislative, and political developments that have, together, erected a dangerous citadel
of government action essentially immune from all traditional forms of constraint that
we have previously relied on to protect the rule of law and individual rights. When
Congress broadly delegates authority to the President himself, the same or greater
risks of arbitrariness that have animated the advocates of a revived nondelegation
doctrine apply at least as pointedly, but the structural and norm-based constraints
that the defenders of agency delegations have offered are largely absent when the
President alone is authorized to act.6
In a much-noted dissent in the October 2018 Term, Justice Gorsuch called
attention to the general nondelegation principle in Gundy v. United States: “The
separation of powers . . . requires Congress to assemble a social consensus before
choosing our nation’s course on policy questions . . . . [And it] requires us to respect
along the way one of the most vital of the procedural protections of individual
liberty found in our Constitution.”7
Gorsuch’s opinion gave new life to an argument that has been raised intermittently and passionately for decades about agencies, ever since the Court began to
indicate that the nondelegation doctrine would not enjoy a robust existence in the
life of its separation-of-powers jurisprudence.8 He explicitly tied the principle of
nondelegation to the protection of individual liberty.9 This Article will show that the
Court should, indeed, take steps to constrain broad delegations—not to dismantle
the entire administrative state, which is well structured to absorb them within familiar
contours of the rule of law—but to cabin unlimited and virtually unreviewable
decisions made by the President alone, unfettered by the trappings of the rule of law.
The nondelegation doctrine posits that, when Congress delegates power to the
executive branch by statute, it must provide an “intelligible principle” to the agency
to follow in implementing that power,10 which serves at least three important
functions. First, it means that the Congress—the constitutional font of policymaking under Article I—has formulated the policy to be served by the provision, as
Justice Gorsuch emphasized in the quoted material above.11 Second, it gives courts
6

See infra Section I.B.
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2145 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
8
See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 14–16, 107–18; Gary Lawson, Delegation and
Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 332, 335–43 (2002).
9
See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2144–45 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); cf. Rebecca L. Brown,
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1513–14 (1991) (arguing
that the separation of powers is a significant structural protection for liberty).
10
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (plurality opinion).
11
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 352–53.
7
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a limit to use when they review the agency action to see if the agency has exceeded
the statutory authority given to it.12 Finally, this rule supplies a guide to the agency
in judging how to exercise the authority given it.13 Together, these three objectives
have served to ameliorate, if not eliminate, many concerns about the uncomfortable
notion of whether Congress can, constitutionally, give away the legislative power
that Article I vests in it.
When the Court struck down two provisions of the National Industrial Recovery
Act in 1935 on delegation grounds,14 it revealed a discomfort with the beginning of
the age of administrative agencies, a discomfort that soon dissipated in the cases. The
“intelligible principle” requirement imposed in those two cases was never explicitly
lifted but subsequently never supplied the basis for a finding of a faulty delegation
that the Congress had made.15
There are many reasons for the relaxation of the “intelligible principle” requirement, and much has been written about whether the relaxation is good or bad.16 Most
of these reasons supporting a tolerance of broader delegation revolve around the
nature of administrative agencies themselves, whose structural characteristics and
judicial oversight serve to counteract the dangers of unprincipled delegation.17 But
in this Article, I wish to shine a light on the particular subset of delegations in which
the President is given a power to be triggered upon his finding of a specified factual
condition. In that situation, much of the ameliorating edifice relied on to defend
delegation is absent.18
Building on the work of administrative law scholars who have identified and
illuminated the several components of the problem over the years, this Article will
seek to show what has happened when a cluster of separate circumstances have come
together to create a new and serious threat to individual liberty when the President
exercises expansive delegated authority. Several doctrinal components lead to this
confluence: First, the moribund “intelligible principle” test has evolved to provide
little or no constraint on this or any other delegation.19 Second, a delegation to the
President, specifically, is not subject to the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), leaving no extrinsic, enforceable obligation to avoid
arbitrary action.20 Third, the Supreme Court has barred from review the correctness
12

See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (discussing the application
of the “intelligible principle” test to congressional grants of legislative discretion).
13
See, e.g., id. at 391 (comparing the statutory range for sentencing guidelines to “the rules
of procedure [that] bind judges and courts in the proper management of the cases before them”).
14
See generally Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
15
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 353–54.
16
See, e.g., 1 DAVIS, supra note 2, §§ 3:2–3:7.
17
See, e.g., 1 id. at § 3:3; Mashaw, supra note 3, at 92–93.
18
See infra Section I.B.
19
See infra text accompanying notes 23–41.
20
See infra Section I.B.1.
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of any factual finding by the President that provides the statutory trigger for his own
power.21 Finally, a new presidential attitude, reflected in the quote that opened this
Article, has ushered in a collapse of the voluntary or informal norms of self-restraint
that once offered some modicum of constraint on presidential power.22
Developments in the Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence over decades
have opened up a dangerous lacuna in the overall constitutional protection against
arbitrary government action, ready to be exploited by any President who might show
an inclination to read his or her power as unlimited and unchecked, undeterred by
the norms of historical practice. When a President walks upon the stage thus set by
prior doctrine, the combination creates a perfect storm for a threat to individual
liberty. The following discussion will first examine each element of the problem in
the case law as fleshed out by earlier scholars, and then examine the ramifications
for the protection of rights today in the center of the storm. I will conclude by suggesting that the nondelegation doctrine should indeed be revived, but specifically
for the purpose of limiting, constraining, and reviewing the actions of a President
pursuant to direct delegated authority.
I. THE SETTING OF THE STAGE
A. The Nondelegation Principle
There has long been a debate among scholars about the rise and demise of the
nondelegation doctrine.23 Without any semblance of agreement on this general topic,
clarity has been achieved on at least two specific factual elements of the narrative:
in 1935, the Supreme Court struck down two provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act on the ground that a congressional delegation lacked sufficient
guidance,24 and it has not struck down a federal law on this stated ground since.25
In one of the cases that form this origin story for the nondelegation doctrine,
Congress had authorized the President to prohibit the transportation in interstate
commerce of petroleum produced in excess of quotas under state law, sometimes
21

See infra Section I.B.2.
See infra text accompanying notes 126–32.
23
Early cases recognized the existence of such an issue as excessive delegation, but the
Supreme Court was reluctant to enter unnecessarily into the complex inquiry that would be
required to enforce the precise boundaries of a delegation and consistently upheld laws challenged on this ground until 1935. See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–46
(1825). See generally 1 DAVIS, supra note 2, §§ 3:1–3:18 (providing a broad overview of
delegation law); JAFFE, supra note 2, at 28–86 (discussing the issues posed by delegations).
24
See Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (holding section 9(c) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act invalid); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935) (holding section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act invalid).
25
Lawson, supra note 8, at 371 (“After 1935, the Court abandoned any serious nondelegation analysis.”).
22
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referred to as “hot oil.”26 The President’s executive order had, in turn, delegated his
power to the Secretary of the Interior to issue regulations for carrying out the mandate.27 The regulations, which were the focus of the challenge by petroleum companies
in Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, imposed obligations on all producers to keep
records showing their compliance with the applicable state rules.28 Among other
constitutional challenges, the companies argued to the Supreme Court that these
departmental regulations rested on an unconstitutional statutory delegation.29 The
Court agreed: Because Congress had not undertaken to decide explicitly that all socalled “hot oil” is injurious or likely to cause unfair competition, nor had it specified
the criteria affecting when such oil might be considered injurious, the Court found
that Congress had left too much to the President’s judgment to make policy choices
about which “hot oil” would be prohibited from interstate shipment.30 With no “intelligible principle” to limit the exercise of the delegated power, the law transcended the
limits of delegation of the lawmaking function and went down in the history books
as one of the principal exemplars of the nondelegation doctrine at work.31
In the subsequent decades, some calls arose in support of bringing back the
nondelegation doctrine.32 By 1993, the movement for a revitalized nondelegation
doctrine had taken important steps forward in scholarship. In an influential book,
David Schoenbrod argued that delegation allows Congress to shirk responsibility for
making hard policy choices and may lead to lessened accountability.33 Other scholars
began weighing in with policy and constitutional arguments against delegation.34 More
26

Panama Refin. Co., 293 U.S. at 406, 418.
Id. at 406–07.
28
Id. at 407–08.
29
Id. at 414–15.
30
Id. at 418.
31
See id. at 429–30. The other case, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
authorized the President to approve “codes of fair competition” for the poultry industry without
defining what fair competition would entail. 295 U.S. 495, 521–22, 530–31 (1935). The Court
found this exceeded Congress’s power to delegate, as well as its power to regulate interstate
commerce. Id. at 551. There are many articles showing the nondelegation principle in prior
cases as well, starting even from the early history of the republic. See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (“The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of
less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are
to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.”).
32
See, e.g., 1 DAVIS, supra note 2, § 3:13 (noting a number of post-1935 Supreme Court
cases where nondelegation was favorably mentioned or where Panama Refining Co. or
Schechter Poultry were cited as authority).
33
SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 4, 8–9, 14–15.
34
See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 136–38 (1995)
(arguing that the abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine undermines lawmaker accountability); Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto:
A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of
27
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recently, those arguments have been supplemented by further attacks on delegation
based on original intentions and original public meaning of the Constitution.35 Even,
perhaps counterintuitively, those who champion the Unitary Executive theory of
total presidential control over the executive branch have offered arguments against
congressional delegation to executive agencies.36 Their concern is that delegation
cleaves the agencies from the President, and they lament that each agency “carries
out a mandate from the Congress directly to the agency, and the congressional delegations displace unitary executive leadership.”37 Justice Scalia was a frequent critic
of delegation, worrying that it empowers agencies to make “value judgments” and
“policy assessments,” a job reserved by the Constitution for the Congress.38 Justice
Rehnquist voiced a similar view.39 More sophisticated critiques suggest that the
vagueness that delegation encourages will result in worse laws.40 The objectors to
delegation, and with them, the crescendo of voices calling for a revival of the nondelegation doctrine, have pressed their case for decades without success in a holding
of the Supreme Court.41
Defenses of delegation to administrative agencies have engendered a variety of
models of the administrative state to help justify these denizens of a “fourth branch” in
our constitutional scheme.42 One early model of the administrative state envisioned
New York, 76 TUL.L.REV. 265, 303–12 (2001) (arguing that the Constitution’s structure and
purpose support a narrow interpretation of executive power, prohibiting the delegation of
policy-making discretion).
35
See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 8, at 333–34 (asserting that legislative delegations are
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution, which may provide some justification
for the nondelegation doctrine).
36
See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive,
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 252 (2010).
37
Id. at 273.
38
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 414–15 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39
See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543–48 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
40
See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 85–91 (describing claims of other critics of delegation
and showing them to be misplaced).
41
Accord does not exist even on the question of whether there ever was an actual nondelegation doctrine with bite. Keith Whittington and Jason Iuliano have argued that nondelegation
has never been an actual constraint on expansive delegations of power and that the narrative
of a “Constitution-in-exile” waiting to be restored is mythical. See Keith E. Whittington & Jason
Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 382–83 (2017);
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000)
(arguing nondelegation has had “one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting)”).
42
See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 575–79 (1984) (defending the independent regulators under a functionalist analysis because each agency has relationships with the named
branches that provide assurances that they will not pass out of control).
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agencies as “mere transmission belt[s] for implementing legislative directives.”43 This
early concept is consistent, of course, with a need for a robust nondelegation doctrine
such as that which the Court employed on those two occasions in the early days.44
The model rests on the ability of an agency to follow a policy directive that comes
from Congress—the heart of what the “intelligible principle” requirement was supposed to achieve.45 This conception also underlies Justice Gorsuch’s paean, quoted
at the opening of this Article, in which he called for a robust nondelegation doctrine
for the protection of individual liberty.46 The kind of legislative control that Justice
Gorsuch envisions seeks to conscript the features of the legislative branch upon which
we rely to justify impairment of liberty—accountability, representative deliberation,
consent of the governed, and public process—and ensure that they are not evaded by
exporting the making of policy to an agency unencumbered by those features.47 Even
in the absence of a robust nondelegation doctrine, courts can police its underlying
values through various interpretative methods such as clear-statement rules.48
Early criticism of the administrative state for its failure to achieve some of these
goals was quelled, for a time, by the unanimous passage of the APA in 1946.49 By providing important procedural safeguards for the actions of agencies in both rulemaking and adjudicative roles50—most significantly, allowing judicial review of
43

Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1675 (1975).
44
See Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935).
45
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (noting that valid
delegation requires Congress to “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to [regulate] is directed to conform”).
46
See also Brown, supra note 9, at 1553 (linking nondelegation to due process).
47
See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2134 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
48
See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2110–15 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Law and Administration]. Sunstein urges the
use of the Avoidance Canon to provide a structural function in the allocation of power and
review. Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1181, 1184–86 (2018). “It insists that Congress, with its distinctive form of democratic accountability and its special constitutional status, must specifically choose to act in a way that raises
serious constitutional problems, whether the issue involves individual rights, federalism, or
presidential power.” Id. at 1185.
49
Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1265 & n.244 (1986) (describing the political history of the passage of the APA); see also
McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L., ECON., &
ORG. 180, 180–83 (1999) (offering a positive political theory account of the passage of
the APA, depicting it as a measure to protect the legacy of the New Deal from possible
Republican retrenchment). McNollgast is a pseudonym for a team comprising Mathew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. Michael Asimow, On Pressing McNollgast
to the Limits: The Problem of Regulatory Costs, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 127 n.1
(1994).
50
See Rabin, supra note 49, at 1265–66 (describing the APA’s main features). These
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agency action—the APA “ushered in a period of unprecedented [judicial] goodwill
towards the regulatory system.”51 Concerns about individual liberty at the hands of
unconstrained bureaucratic actors were abated, temporarily, because “[t]he Act was
a formal articulation of agency due process in return for the newly recognized powers
of wide-ranging administrative intervention in the economy.”52 The key functional
test for legitimate agency delegation has been whether the enabling statute “sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be
known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will.”53 The
constitutionality of the delegation is explicitly linked to the possibility of judicial
review in support of due process standards.54
Perhaps this trade-off, a broader realm for delegation that is disciplined by the
due-process constraints of the APA, serves as at least a partial explanation for the
Court’s willingness to retreat from its activist posture with regard to delegation that
had characterized the cases of 1935.55 Although there is danger in attributing specific
motivation to Court actions—especially in that fraught period of its history—the
Court’s failure to enforce the nondelegation doctrine invites speculation that the
enactment of the APA may have diminished the rule-of-law concerns that had
shadowed the administrative state from the start.56
A second model of the administrative state sought to justify the discretion
accorded agencies by recognizing the need of Congress to avail itself of assistance,
broadly articulated, in carrying out its complex legislative tasks.57 In particular,
Congress must enlist and rely on the judgment of experts, whose decisions could be
expected to rest on professionalism and science rather than political will.58 “The
procedural safeguards included notice-and-comment requirements and an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of judicial review for informal rulemaking, as well as a relatively stringent
“substantial evidence” standard of judicial review for adjudicative agency decisions. Id. The
APA is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706.
51
Rabin, supra note 49, at 1266.
52
See id.
53
See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944).
54
Id. at 426, 444.
55
See generally Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
56
There are pitfalls in leaping to intuitive conclusions about what the Court did and did
not do during the New Deal and post–New Deal periods. There is no attempt here to wade
into that fraught debate between the so-called “internalists,” who attribute Court motivations
to their own jurisprudential or legal commitments, and the “externalists,” who look to outside
considerations such as political landscape to explain Court behavior. See generally Laura
Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1052
(2005) (recounting the debates and seeking to deconstruct the labels).
57
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940) (“Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as
necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not become a futility.”).
58
See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10–17 (1938) (presenting the
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expertise model was the brainchild of the New Dealers who offered science and
economics as a solution to the market failures that created the Depression.”59 The
idea here is that delegation must be allowed in a world in which expertise is required
to develop and implement policy, often in technical areas that would be well beyond
the ability of Congress to master.60 Expertise was not only acceptable and needed
but actually well-designed to resist arbitrary political influence because it is intrinsically bound by the knowledge and ethics of the professions: “[P]ersons subject to the
administrator’s control are no more liable to his arbitrary will than are patients remitted
to the care of a skilled doctor.”61 Indeed, some go so far as to say that the reliance
on experts to refine policy may contribute to better public decision-making because
allowing administrators to elaborate facts with public involvement can have the
potential to build a consensus that would otherwise be elusive and to infuse political
decisions with the possibility for collective agreement.62 But overall, the expertise
model was a way to lessen discomfort with giving discretion to agency officials.63
Lisa Schultz Bressman has intriguingly suggested that these early models for
justifying the administrative state were largely supplanted in the 1970s by a realism
fueled by the interest-group representation focus of that period.64 Under that view,
legitimacy of agencies would be sought in a different kind of requirement—that they
offer access to a wider range of affected interests, through an intensified obligation
to articulate the factual and legal reasons for their actions, including why they
rejected alternatives.65 This change in the focus of the defenders of the administrative state carries with it an implicit commitment to a majoritarian paradigm that is
skeptical of judicial review generally and of rights protection specifically.66 Agencies were to be accepted and accommodated into our democracy by ensuring that
first notable comprehensive justification for the administrative state based on the expertise
of professionals within the agencies).
59
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 471 & n.37 (2003) (describing the expertise
idea and attributing it to James Landis).
60
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 41–42 (1825). For particularly useful
discussions of delegations, see generally 1 DAVIS, supra note 2, §§ 3:3–3:18, and JAFFE,
supra note 2, at 28–86.
61
Stewart, supra note 43, at 1678.
62
See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 99 (seeking to refute some of the arguments favoring the
nondelegation doctrine).
63
See Bressman, supra note 59, at 471–72.
64
Id. at 475.
65
Id. at 475–76.
66
Id. at 480. Bressman rightly notes the parallel between this move in administrative law
and the rise of scholarly acceptance by constitutional theorists of Alexander Bickel’s description
of judicial review as creating a counter-majoritarian difficulty. Id. at 482; see Rebecca L.
Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 531–32 (1998)
(laying blame at the feet of Bickel for an impoverishment of constitutional theory due to a
charge that courts are “deviant” in a democracy).
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PDMRULWDULDQSDUDGLJPIRUDJHQF\OHJLWLPDF\ZKHQVKHZURWHLQIDYRURIDPRGHORI
SUHVLGHQWLDOFRQWURORIDJHQF\DFWLRQ$FFRXQWDELOLW\SOD\VDVLJQLILFDQWUROHLQ
.DJDQ¶VDUJXPHQWIRUZKDWVKHFDOOHG³SUHVLGHQWLDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQ´ZKLFKVKHDUJXHG
ZRXOGSURPRWHWKHYDOXHVRIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHDFFRXQWDELOLW\+HUSURSRVDO²YLHZHG
DVRQHRIWKHSLOODUVRIWKHVRFDOOHG³SUHVLGHQWLDOFRQWURO´WKHRU\²ZDVGLUHFWHGWR
VLWXDWLRQVLQZKLFK3UHVLGHQWVSDUWLFLSDWHLQDJHQF\GHFLVLRQVLQ³WKHH[HUFLVHRItheir
GHOHJDWHGDXWKRULW\´³7KH3UHVLGHQW¶VLQYROYHPHQWDWOHDVWLISXEOLFO\GLVFORVHG
YHVWVWKHDFWLRQZLWKDQLQFUHDVHGGRVHRIDFFRXQWDELOLW\ZKLFKUHQGHUVWKH
DFWLRQOHVVWURXEOHVRPHWKDQVROHO\EXUHDXFUDWLFPHDVXUHVIURPWKHVWDQGSRLQWRI
GHPRFUDWLFYDOXHV´7KXVSUHVLGHQWLDOFRQWUROFDQEH\HWDQRWKHUPHFKDQLVPE\
ZKLFKWRUHGHHPWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHVWDWH
%XW.DJDQ¶VDUJXPHQWEHJLQVDQGHQGVZLWKSUHVLGHQWLDOLQYROYHPHQWLQWKH
GHFLVLRQVRIDJHQFLHV,ISXUHDFFRXQWDELOLW\ZHUHLQGHHGWKHVROH\DUGVWLFNE\
ZKLFKGHOHJDWLRQVZHUHWREHPHDVXUHGWKHQWKHRUHWLFDOO\GHOHJDWLRQVWRWKH3UHVL
GHQWKLPRUKHUVHOIVKRXOGEHVSHFLDOO\IDYRUHGGHOHJDWLRQVDV3UHVLGHQWVSUHVXP
DEO\DUHPRUHSROLWLFDOO\DFFRXQWDEOHWKDQDJHQFLHV%XW.DJDQZDVFDUHIXOWR
DFNQRZOHGJHWKDWVKHGLGQRWJRWKDWIDU,QGHHGVKHZRUULHGWKDWVXFKDGLUHFW
GHOHJDWLRQWRWKH3UHVLGHQWZRXOGJLYHULVHWRQHZDQGGLIIHUHQWLVVXHVUHODWHGWRWKH
UXOHRIODZ5DWKHUKHUWKHVLVZDVDWSDLQVWRGLVWLQJXLVKKHUVXJJHVWHGSUHVLGHQWLDO


See, e.g.%UHVVPDQsupraQRWHDW Q TXRWLQJ6WHZDUWsupraQRWH
DW 

Id.

7KLVLVWUXHRQO\LQWKHRU\RIFRXUVHDVWKH3UHVLGHQWLVQRWVHOHFWHGE\DQDWODUJH
YRWHSee86&2167DUW,,id.DPHQG;,,

%UHVVPDQsupraQRWHDW

(OHQD.DJDQPresidential Administration+$59/5(9±  

See id.DW

See id.DW HPSKDVLVDGGHG 

Id.DW

See id.DW

See id.DW

See id. DW

Id. ³>3@UHVLGHQWLDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQJLYHVULVHWRQRQHRIWKHUXOHRIODZLVVXHVWKDWPLJKW

@:+2&21675$,1635(6,'(17,$/(;(5&,6(2)'(/(*$7('32:(56" 
LQYROYHPHQWLQWKHH[HUFLVHRISRZHUGHOHJDWHGWRDQDJHQF\IURPDGLUHFWGHOHJD
WLRQRISRZHUWRD3UHVLGHQW
(YHQZLWKWKHFDYHDWWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOFRQWUROPRGHO¶VLQFUHDVHGHPSKDVLVRQ
DFFRXQWDELOLW\DVDSULQFLSDOYDOXHWREHVHUYHGE\DGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZLVFRQWURYHU
VLDO7KHSUHHPLQHQWMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUDJHQFLHVKDVQHYHUODLQLQWKHLUDFFRXQWDELOLW\
DVVXFKEXWLQWKHFRQVLVWHQWHIIRUWWRFDELQDQGFRQWUROWKHH[HUFLVHRIDUELWUDU\
JRYHUQPHQWDFWLRQWKURXJKYDULRXVPHDQVUHODWHGWRUXOHRIODZ6HHQWKDWZD\WKH
PRYHWRLQFUHDVHWKHUROHRIWKH3UHVLGHQWLQWKHH[HUFLVHRIGHOHJDWHGSRZHUDV
VXJJHVWHGE\.DJDQSUREDEO\JRHVLQH[DFWO\WKHZURQJGLUHFWLRQE\OHVVHQLQJ
FRQWURORIDUELWUDULQHVV%XW.DJDQVWUHVVHGWKHDPHOLRUDWLYHUROHXQGHUKHUSUR
SRVDORIYLJRURXVSDUWLFLSDWLRQE\&RQJUHVVEXUHDXFUDWLFH[SHUWVDQGFRQVWLWXHQF\
JURXSV DOO RYHUVHHQ E\ D UREXVW UROH IRU FRXUWV LQ DOORFDWLQJ SRZHU DPRQJ WKH
YDULRXVLQVWLWXWLRQVY\LQJIRUDGPLQLVWUDWLYHSRZHU7KXVWKHUHLVDWOHDVWLQWKHRU\
VRPHWKLQJIRUWKHMXGLFLDU\WRUHYLHZDQGKHUPDMRULWDULDQEDVHGWKHRU\GRHVQRW
DOWRJHWKHUDEDQGRQWKHWUDGLWLRQDOFRPPLWPHQWWRWKHFRQVWUDLQWRIDJHQFLHVEDVHG
RQUXOHRIODZ
1HYHUWKHOHVVUHVSRQVHWRWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOFRQWUROPRGHOFULWLFL]HGLWIRUSULYLOHJ
LQJDFFRXQWDELOLW\DWWKHH[SHQVHRIGLVFLSOLQHGGHFLVLRQPDNLQJXQGHUWKHUXOHRI
ODZ 1RQDUELWUDULQHVV QRW SXUH DFFRXQWDELOLW\ ZDV UHDOO\ DW WKH KHDUW RI ZKDW
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZQHHGHGWRDFKLHYHJRLQJIXOOFLUFOHWRDUJXHWKDWGHOHJDWLRQLV
YDOLGDVORQJDVLWFDQEHGLVFLSOLQHGWRFRQIRUPWRWKHQRUPVRIOHJLWLPDWHGHFLVLRQ
PDNLQJLQDGHPRFUDF\$JHQFLHVVKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRGWREHDSRVLWLYHIRUFHLQ
RXUGHPRFUDF\LIWKH\DUHFRPSHOOHGWRFDELQWKHLURZQGLVFUHWLRQWKURXJKYDULRXV
OLPLWLQJVWDQGDUGVLPSOHPHQWHGWKURXJKUHTXLUHPHQWVRIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZ7KXV
FOHDUVWDWHPHQWUXOHVEDVHGRQWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOUROHRI&RQJUHVVDVSROLF\PDNHUFDQ
ORRPODUJHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIGLUHFWGHOHJDWLRQV´ ,WLVWKLVODWWHUFDWHJRU\WKDWLVWKHVXEMHFW
RIWKHSUHVHQWSURMHFW

See id. DW

Cf.%URZQsupraQRWHDW DUJXLQJWKDWSURWHFWLRQDJDLQVWW\UDQQ\RUDUELWUDU\
DFWLRQDQGQRWDFFRXQWDELOLW\LVWKHSULQFLSDOJRDORIWKHVWUXFWXUDO&RQVWLWXWLRQ 

%UHVVPDQsupraQRWHDW±

See .DJDQsupraQRWHDW

Id.DW±

Id. GLVFXVVLQJ WKH FRQWLQXHG QHFHVVLW\ IRU WUDGLWLRQDO UXOH RI ODZ WKURXJK DJHQF\
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ 

%UHVVPDQsupraQRWHDW ³>$@GPLQLVWUDWLYHODZVFKRODUVVKRXOGUHWKLQNZKHWKHU
WKHPDMRULWDULDQSDUDGLJPSURYLGHVDQDGHTXDWHPHWULFIRUDVVHVVLQJWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIDJHQF\
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ´ 

See id.DW±

See/LVD6FKXOW]%UHVVPDQ6FKHFKWHU3RXOWU\at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine
for the Administrative State<$/(/-±  see also&$66568167(,1
7+(3$57,$/&2167,787,21   GHVFULELQJWKHUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWKDV
D³SXEOLFUHJDUGLQJ´UHDVRQIRUZKDWLWGRHVDVFHQWUDOWROHJLWLPDF\ 
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VWDQGLQIRUODFNOXVWHUQRQGHOHJDWLRQUXOHVSUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHWKHSULQFLSDOFRQFHUQ
LVQRWDFFRXQWDELOLW\EXWUDWKHUWUDQVSDUHQF\DQGILGHOLW\WRFRQVWLWXWLRQDOQRUPV
7KLVTXLFNWRXUWKURXJKWKHPDMRUMXVWLI\LQJWKHRULHVRIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZKDV
DSXUSRVHXQUHODWHGWRWRXWLQJWKHPDVVWURQJRUZHDNULJKWRUZURQJ,WVJRDOLVWR
VXEVWDQWLDWHDUHYHDOLQJREVHUYDWLRQDERXWWKHUHDVRQVWKDWDUDQJHRIVFKRODUVKDYH
RIIHUHGIRUZK\WKH\WKLQNWKDWGHOHJDWLRQLVRULVQRWOHJLWLPDWH)RUHDFKGLVWLQFW
SRVLWLRQWKDWKDVEHHQSXWIRUZDUGE\DUDQJHRIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZVFKRODUVRQWKH
SURSULHW\YHOQRQRIGHOHJDWLRQWKHSRVLWLRQVWKDWWKHDXWKRUVKDYHWDNHQDUHWLHGWR
ZKHWKHUWKHDXWKRUVHHVWKHH[HUFLVHRIGHOHJDWHGSRZHUDVDGHTXDWHO\FDELQHGE\
WKH FRQVWUDLQWV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH UXOH RI ODZ 7KRVH ZKR KDYH FRQVLVWHQWO\
RSSRVHG GHOHJDWLRQ EHOLHYH WKDW LW LQYLWHV DUELWUDU\ DQG XQDFFRXQWDEOH SROLF\
PDNLQJ7KRVHZKRVXSSRUWGHOHJDWLRQEHFDXVHDJHQFLHVFDQEHWKH³WUDQVPLVVLRQ
EHOW´IRU&RQJUHVVWRLPSOHPHQWLWVFRQVLGHUHGSROLFLHVKROGWKDWEHOLHIEHFDXVHWKH\
KDYHWUXVWLQWKHDELOLW\RI&RQJUHVVWRLQVLVWRQLWVSROLF\PDNLQJUROHDQGRQDQ
DJHQF\WRIROORZLWVLQVWUXFWLRQVFDUHIXOO\RUEHKHOGUHVSRQVLEOHLIWKH\GRQRW
7KRVHZKREHOLHYHLQGHOHJDWLRQEHFDXVHRIUHOLDQFHRQWKHH[SHUWLVHRIDJHQF\DFWRUV
GRVREHFDXVHWKH\EHOLHYHWKDWWKHVWUXFWXUHRIDJHQFLHVLVVXFKWKDWSROLWLFDOZLOO
FDQEHILOWHUHGRXWDQGGLVFLSOLQHGE\VFLHQWLILFGDWD7KLVVFKRRORIEHOLHIUHOLHV
KHDYLO\RQWKHREOLJDWLRQRIDJHQFLHVWRSURYLGHUHDVRQVIRUWKHLUDFWLRQVZLWKMXGLFLDO
UHYLHZRIWHQDYDLODEOHDVDGLVFLSOLQLQJGHYLFH
(YHQWKRVHZKREHOLHYHLQWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHVWDWHDVDZD\WRPDQDJHLQWHUHVW
JURXSSOXUDOLVPDQGPD[LPL]HWKHSUHIHUHQFHVRIDPDMRULW\LQVLVWXSRQDVWUXFWXUH
WKDWZLOOKROGDJHQFLHVXOWLPDWHO\WRVKRZRQWKHUHFRUGZKLFKJURXSVLWOLVWHQHGWR
ZKLFKLWUHMHFWHGDQGZK\7KLVPRGHOFRXQWVRQDFKRUXVRIGLIIHUHQWYRLFHVWR
FRQVWLWXWHLWVFRQFHSWLRQRIDGHPRFUDWLFDOO\OHJLWLPDWHSROLF\PDNLQJERG\WKURXJK
WKH SOXUDOLVW EDWWOH RI FRQIOLFWLQJ LQWHUHVWV $JDLQ WKH RYHUVLJKW RI UHDVRQHG
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJE\FRXUWVSURYLGHVDQHVVHQWLDOFKHFN
1RWRQHRIWKHVHHVVHQWLDOVDOXWDU\VWUXFWXUDOIHDWXUHVH[LVWVZKHQWKH&RQJUHVV
GHOHJDWHVSRZHUGLUHFWO\WRWKH3UHVLGHQW


See %UHVVPDQsupraQRWHDW6XQVWHLQLaw and Administration supra QRWH
DW±

See infra QRWHV±DQGDFFRPSDQ\LQJWH[W

See, e.g.6&+2(1%52'supra QRWHDW±±5(',6+supra QRWHDW±

See, e.g.6WHZDUWsupra QRWHDW6WUDXVVsupra QRWHDW±

See, e.g.-$))(supraQRWHDW

See'HS¶WRI&RPY1HZ<RUN6&W±   UHPDQGLQJ
WKH'HSDUWPHQWRI&RPPHUFH¶VGHFLVLRQWRLQFOXGHDFLWL]HQVKLSTXHVWLRQRQWKHFHQVXV
WRWKHDJHQF\IRUIDLOXUHRIWKH6HFUHWDU\WRRIIHUSODXVLEOHUHDVRQVIRUKLVGHFLVLRQ 

See%UHVVPDQsupraQRWHDW±6WHZDUWsupraQRWHDW

See%UHVVPDQsupraQRWHDW6WHZDUWsupraQRWHDW±Q GLV
FXVVLQJ&KDUOHV$5HLFKThe Law of the Planned Society<$/(/-±  

See 6WHZDUWsupraQRWHDW±

SeeGLVFXVVLRQinfra6HFWLRQ,%

@:+2&21675$,1635(6,'(17,$/(;(5&,6(2)'(/(*$7('32:(56" 
B. The President as a Recipient of Delegated Power
1R$3$&RYHUDJH
,QWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZDUHQDWKH$3$SOD\VDQH[WUDRUGLQDULO\LPSRUWDQWUROH
LQSURWHFWLQJLQGLYLGXDOULJKWVDQGSURPRWLQJDFFRXQWDELOLW\RIYDULRXVNLQGV6RPH
KDYHHYHQDUJXHGWKDWLWLVFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\UHTXLUHGLIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHDJHQFLHVDUH
WREHWROHUDWHGLQRXUFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVWUXFWXUH)RUDWLPHDIWHULWVSDVVDJHLQ
WKHUHZDVXQFHUWDLQW\DERXWZKHWKHUWKH$3$¶VUHTXLUHPHQWVRIQRQDUELWUDULQHVVDQG
FKHFNVRIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZZRXOGDSSO\WRGHOHJDWLRQVGLUHFWO\WRWKH3UHVLGHQW6RPH
FRPPHQWDU\GLVFXVVLQJWKH+RXVH-XGLFLDU\+HDULQJVVXJJHVWHGWKDWEHFDXVHWKH
3UHVLGHQWZDVQRWVSHFLILFDOO\H[FOXGHGIURPWKH$3$¶VGHILQLWLRQRI³DJHQF\´WKH
EHVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQZDVWKDW³ZKHQWKH3UHVLGHQWDFWVLQWKHFDSDFLW\RIDQDGPLQLV
WUDWLYHRIILFHWKH$FWDSSOLHVWRKLP´7KHIDLOXUHWRH[FOXGHVXJJHVWHGLQFOXVLRQ
1RWXQWLOGLGWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWUHVROYHWKLVTXHVWLRQKROGLQJMXVWWKHRSSR
VLWHLQFranklin v. Massachusetts7KH&RXUWUHDVRQHGWKDW³>R@XWRIUHVSHFWIRUWKH
VHSDUDWLRQRISRZHUVDQGWKHXQLTXHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSRVLWLRQRIWKH3UHVLGHQW
WH[WXDOVLOHQFHLVQRWHQRXJKWRVXEMHFWWKH3UHVLGHQWWRWKHSURYLVLRQVRIWKH$3$´
IRUDEXVHRIGLVFUHWLRQ7KXVRQHRIWKHSULQFLSDOEXOZDUNVSURWHFWLQJDJDLQVW
GHYROXWLRQE\DIRXUWKEUDQFKRIJRYHUQPHQWSHUKDSVHYHQWKHYHU\UHDVRQWKDWWKH
FRXUWVKDYHWROHUDWHGDQGH[SDQGHGWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHVWDWHLQWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVFKHPH
LVXQDYDLODEOHWRVHFXUHOLPLWVRUUHYLHZIRUWUDQVIHUVRISRZHUGLUHFWO\IURPWKH
&RQJUHVVWRWKH3UHVLGHQW)RUVXFKGHOHJDWLRQVQHLWKHUDUREXVWQRQGHOHJDWLRQGRF
WULQHQRUWKHGXHSURFHVVEDVHGSURWHFWLRQRIWKH$3$LVDYDLODEOH'HOHJDWLRQV
WRWKH3UHVLGHQWWKHUHIRUHVKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGZLWKJUHDWFDXWLRQDQGVNHSWLFLVP
,WLVWUXHWKDWWKH&RXUWKDGXSKHOGVRPHGHOHJDWLRQVWRWKH3UHVLGHQWDJDLQVW
QRQGHOHJDWLRQFKDOOHQJHVEHIRUHLWVGRXEOHZKDPP\RI²HYHQEHIRUHDQ\
$3$ZDVLQH[LVWHQFHRUHYHQFRQWHPSODWHG7KHVHFDVHVZHUHRIDGLVFUHWHW\SH


See, e.g.-RKQ*6DODWNDThe Agency of the President and Cabinet Members Under
the Administrative Procedure Act&$7+8/5(9  

Id.DW

Id.DW±Q TXRWLQJ0,/7210&$552:7+(%$&.*5281'2)$'0,1,6
75$7,9(/$:   DUJXLQJWKDWWKH3UHVLGHQWDFWLQJRQGHOHJDWHGDXWKRULW\UDWKHUWKDQ
KLVRZQFRQVWLWXWLRQDODXWKRULW\LVDQ³DJHQF\´ZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRIWKH$3$ 

86±  

Id.

See id.

See id.

See, e.g.&DUJRRIWKH%ULJ$XURUDY8QLWHG6WDWHV The Brig Aurora 86 &UDQFK
   XSKROGLQJGHOHJDWLRQWRWKH3UHVLGHQWRISRZHUWRVXVSHQGDWUDGHHPEDUJR
XSRQDILQGLQJWKDWWKHFRXQWULHVKDGFHDVHGYLRODWLQJWKHQHXWUDOFRPPHUFHRIWKH8QLWHG
6WDWHV -:+DPSWRQ-U &RY8QLWHG6WDWHV86±   XSKROGLQJ
GHOHJDWLRQWRWKH3UHVLGHQWWRDGMXVWWDULIIVXSRQDILQGLQJWKDWUDWHVGRQRWIDLUO\UHIOHFWGLI
IHUHQFHVLQFRVWVRISURGXFWLRQ 
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WKH\WHQGHGWRLQYROYHDQDUWLFXODWHGOHJLVODWLYHSROLF\DFFRPSDQLHGE\DSURYLVR
DOORZLQJIRULWVVXVSHQVLRQLQWKHHYHQWRIDFKDQJHLQLPSRUWDQWFLUFXPVWDQFHVVXFK
DVFKDQJHVLQUHODWLRQVZLWKRWKHUFRXQWULHV²NQRZQDVDFRQWLQJHQF\PRGHORI
GHOHJDWLRQ,QWKLVW\SHRIFDVHRIWHQLQYROYLQJWKHOHY\RUVXVSHQVLRQRIWDULIIV
XQGHUDSROLF\WKDWWKH&RQJUHVVKDGDUWLFXODWHGWKURXJKOHJLVODWLRQWKH&RXUWZDV
QRWFRQFHUQHGWKDWSODFLQJWKHSRZHULQWKH3UHVLGHQWWRGHWHUPLQHWKHWULJJHULQJ
FRQGLWLRQZDVDGHUHOLFWLRQRIWKHOHJLVODWXUH¶VMRE
>,@WLVRIWHQGHVLUDEOHLIQRWHVVHQWLDOIRUWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKH
LQWHUHVWVRIRXUSHRSOHDJDLQVWWKHXQIULHQGO\RUGLVFULPLQDWLQJ
UHJXODWLRQVHVWDEOLVKHGE\IRUHLJQJRYHUQPHQWVLQWKHLQWHUHVWV
RIWKHLUSHRSOHWRLQYHVWWKH3UHVLGHQWZLWKODUJHGLVFUHWLRQLQ
PDWWHUVDULVLQJRXWRIWKHH[HFXWLRQRIVWDWXWHVUHODWLQJWRWUDGH
DQGFRPPHUFHZLWKRWKHUQDWLRQV
7KHVHFDVHVLOOXVWUDWHDGLVWLQFWFODVVRIOHJLVODWLRQLQVWHDGRIDXWKRUL]LQJWKHH[HFXWLYH
EUDQFKWRVXSSOHPHQWRULQWHUSUHWWKHFRQJUHVVLRQDOSROLF\ZLWKGHWDLOHGUHJXODWLRQ
&RQJUHVVLQVWHDGGLUHFWVZKHWKHULWVRZQSROLF\ZLOORUZLOOQRWEHDSSOLHGGHSHQG
LQJRQDQH[WHUQDOIDFWWKDWWKH3UHVLGHQWPXVWILQG7KLVUHSUHVHQWVWKHVWURQJHVW
YHUVLRQRIWKH³LQWHOOLJLEOHSULQFLSOH´DWZRUNEHFDXVHRILWVQDWXUHDVDQ³RQRII
VZLWFK´FRQWUROOLQJWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIWKHFRQJUHVVLRQDOSROLF\,WLVDWOHDVWSRVVLEOH
SHUKDSVHYHQSODXVLEOHWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VWROHUDQFHRIWKHVHHDUO\GHOHJDWLRQVHQWLWOLQJ
WKH3UHVLGHQWWRFRQGLWLRQDOO\OLIWFRQJUHVVLRQDOO\GHVLJQHGUHVWULFWLRQVHVSHFLDOO\
LQDUHDV ZKHUH KHHQMR\HGVRPHGHJUHHRILQGHSHQGHQWFRQVWLWXWLRQDODXWKRULW\
,QField v. Clark86  WKH&RXUWXSKHOGDSURYLVLRQ
RIWKH7DULII$FWRIRQDVLPLODUWKHRU\7KH7DULII$FWDXWKRUL]HGWKH
3UHVLGHQWWRVXVSHQGIDYRUDEOHWDULIIWUHDWPHQWIRUQDWLRQVWKDWLPSRVHG
RQ$PHULFDQSURGXFWVDQ\³H[DFWLRQVDQGGXWLHVZKLFKKHIRXQGWR
EHXQHTXDODQGXQUHDVRQDEOH´Id. DW$VLQThe Brig Aurora
WKH&RXUWIRXQGWKDW&RQJUHVVFRXOGGHOHJDWHWKHDXWKRULW\WRGHWHUPLQH
ZKHWKHUDIDFWXDO³FRQWLQJHQF\´KDGRFFXUUHGId.DW±6XFK
DGPLQLVWUDWLYH IDFWILQGLQJ SRZHU GLIIHUHG LQ NLQG IURP OHJLVODWLYH
SRZHUWRPDNHODZRUVHWSROLF\
%UHVVPDQsupraQRWHDWQ ILUVWWZRDOWHUDWLRQVLQRULJLQDO 

See generally The Brig Aurora86 &UDQFK DW±J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co.86DW±Field86DW±

See, e.g.Field86DW± DIILUPLQJWKHQRQGHOHJDWLRQSULQFLSOHEXWILQGLQJ
WKDWLWZDVQRWYLRODWHGEHFDXVH³>Q@RWKLQJLQYROYLQJWKHH[SHGLHQF\RUWKHMXVWRSHUDWLRQRI
VXFKOHJLVODWLRQZDVOHIWWRWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKH3UHVLGHQW´ 

Id.DW

See, e.g. The Brig Aurora86 &UDQFK DWJ.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.
86DW±Field86DW±

See The Brig Aurora86 &UDQFK DWJ.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.86
DWField86DW±

@:+2&21675$,1635(6,'(17,$/(;(5&,6(2)'(/(*$7('32:(56" 
UHIOHFWHGDEHOLHIWKDWWKHVHSUHVLGHQWLDOGHFLVLRQVZHUHQRWOLNHO\WRUHVXOWLQDUEL
WUDU\GHFLVLRQPDNLQJDQGZHUHPHUHO\JDWHNHHSLQJPHDVXUHVIRUWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI
FRQJUHVVLRQDOSROLF\
7KHFDVHVE\FRQWUDVWLQYROYHGJUDQWVRIDXWKRULW\WRWKH3UHVLGHQWWRLQLWLDWH
SROLF\ SHUKDSV FUHDWLQJ ³SDUWLFXODUO\ LQWROHUDEOH RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRU DUELWUDULQHVV
JLYHQWKHH[WUDRUGLQDU\EUHDGWKRIWKHGHOHJDWLRQV3HUKDSVWKHJUDQWRIDXWKRULW\GL
UHFWO\WRWKH3UHVLGHQWPDGHWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUUHJXODWRU\SROLF\WRIDYRUSULYDWH
LQWHUHVWJURXSVSDUWLFXODUO\HDV\DQGWKHVFRSHRIWKDWDXWKRULW\PDGHWKHLPSDFWRI
WKRVHRSSRUWXQLWLHVSDUWLFXODUO\PHQDFLQJ´7KHVHGLVWLQFWLRQVRIIHUDJURXQGLQJ
FRQVLVWHQF\EHWZHHQWKHROGFDVHVDQGWKHUHYROXWLRQDU\KROGLQJVRI
1R5HYLHZRI)DFWXDO)LQGLQJVWKDW7ULJJHU3RZHU
:KLOH VRPH GHFLVLRQV WKDW WKH 3UHVLGHQW PDNHV LQ WKHRU\ DUH DPHQDEOH WR
OLPLWHGMXGLFLDOUHYLHZIRUDOOHJHGFRQVWLWXWLRQDORUVSHFLILFVWDWXWRU\YLRODWLRQV
WKHODFNRI$3$FRYHUDJHRIWKH3UHVLGHQWKDVPHDQWWKDWWKHUHFDQEHQRUHYLHZIRU
DEXVH RI GLVFUHWLRQ RU H[FHHGLQJ DXWKRULW\ JUDQWHG E\ VWDWXWHV 0RUHRYHU WKH
&RXUWH[SDQGHGLWVUXOLQJLQFranklinWRSURYLGHWKDWLIDVWDWXWHGHOHJDWHVDGHFLVLRQ
WRWKHGLVFUHWLRQRIWKH3UHVLGHQWWKHQMXGLFLDOUHYLHZRXWVLGHWKHSDUDPHWHUVRIWKH
$3$LVDOVRQRWDYDLODEOH


See Field86DW± QRWLQJWKDW³&RQJUHVVLWVHOISUHVFULEHGLQDGYDQFH
WKHGXWLHVWREHOHYLHG1RWKLQJLQYROYLQJWKHH[SHGLHQF\RUWKHMXVWRSHUDWLRQRIVXFK
OHJLVODWLRQZDVOHIWWRWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKH3UHVLGHQW´ 

%UHVVPDQsupraQRWHDW

See, e.g.<RXQJVWRZQ6KHHW 7XEH&RY6DZ\HU The Steel Seizure Case 86
±   ILQGLQJWKDWWKH3UHVLGHQWODFNHGWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDODXWKRULW\WRLVVXHDQ
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conditions or “motives which . . . induced the exercise of the power” were “considerations . . . beyond the reach” of the judiciary.124 This sweeping rejection, ostensibly
on constitutional grounds, of any role in supervising the exercise of delegated power,
has had a lasting impact on the landscape of presidential constraint.125
In a somewhat obscure but significant line of follow-on cases, the Court has
only hardened its unyielding hostility toward reviewing any determinations or findings
that a President makes to trigger the authority to implement a statutory power, on
the ground that it cannot review questions about whether the President’s actions
exceeded the scope of the authority granted.126 This is a consequential posture for
the Court to make, resting, as it does, on an elusive distinction between claims that
the President lacked power to do what he did (potentially reviewable) and claims
charging an abuse of discretion in exercising a power given (not reviewable)—even
though the alleged abuse of discretion comes in the form of finding a fact that is the
legal prerequisite to the existence of presidential power to act.127 As Stack noted in
2009 and is still true today, the Court’s “curious authority versus excess-in-exercise
distinction is alive and well.”128
For decades, this system was built on trust of the Executive to constrain itself and
to respond to public pressure to exercise the delegated powers carefully.129 Public
accountability had become the only check.130 Yet even public accountability imposes
no specific constraints, unlike the APA, which was designed to further certain kinds
of accountability through notice- and comment-requirements and obligations for
agencies to provide reasons for their more significant actions.131 Despite the wide
recognition that reasons are essential to legitimate administrative lawmaking,132
exercise of power by the President alone pursuant to direct delegation are subject to
no requirement of public reasons or justifying rationales.
124

Id. at 184.
See id.; see also Stack, supra note 122, at 1185–87, 1197.
126
See Stack, supra note 122, at 1185–87, 1197 (identifying this line of cases and documenting the widespread use of the delegation device by Congress from the early days of the
republic). Stack points out the irony that it was the statutory condition that helped to validate
this type of statute from invalidation on nondelegation grounds. See id. at 1175 n.22. By specifying the triggering condition, the legislature was appropriately making the policy determination
that was required for a valid delegation. See id.
127
See id. at 1173, 1193.
128
Id. at 1197.
129
See generally Edward Cantu, The Separation-of-Powers and the Least Dangerous
Branch, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2015).
130
See generally id. (arguing that a combination of several judicial doctrines in the separationof-powers area has contributed to a relegation of enforcement of such principles to the political process).
131
Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177,
181–83, 199–200.
132
See id. at 181–83 (describing requirements imposed to facilitate review of the reasonableness of the exercise of agency discretion, which include “detailed explanations” of their actions).
125
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3. No Expertise
One change occasioned by the expansion of delegation in the New Deal was
that, while delegations to agencies were linked to the need for expertise in the
crafting of policy for an increasingly complex society,133 delegations directly to the
President showed no sign of the link to expertise. Perhaps the only claim of “expertise” a President could make simply by virtue of holding the office would lie in areas
that the Constitution reserves to the President, such as foreign relations.134 Expertise has
never been cited, however, as a justification for the many statutes delegating power to
the President to make policy in areas as diverse as land use, the military, public health,
trade, federal pay schedules, agriculture, transportation, communications, and criminal
law—all of which topics can be regulated as the result of an emergency declaration
by the President.135 Thus, the legitimating effects of expertise in the agency context,
whatever they may be, do not extend to direct delegations to the President.
II. NEW CONCERNS FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
It is against this backdrop of doctrines and developments in the law that an invitation to take part in this Symposium on the topic of The Presidency and Individual
Rights came to me. The stage had been set by many decades of law, motivated by
a whole variety of intuitions and contexts. Each development has been very well
identified and ably discussed by the most creative administrative law scholars in the
country, to whose work I have only tipped a hat in this Article, and even so, have
not here had the occasion to highlight many important contributions to the debates.
But what is new is a genuine fear that, in confluence, these various doctrines
create a tapestry of law built on the trust that a President accountable to all the
people will always act in good faith for the common good. Yet such a set of doctrines is not equipped to impose meaningful checks in the event that such trust is
betrayed. Individual rights are in the crosshairs.
A. A Proliferation of Statutory Delegations
Running alongside the popular notion of a constrained executive—held in check
by a vigilant Congress and overseen by a principled judiciary136—lies a shadowy
133

See supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text.
As discussed above, this could perhaps explain the early cases that upheld statutes
permitting Presidents to lift congressional tariffs or embargos if facts relating to the target
countries were to change.
135
See Declared National Emergencies Under the National Emergencies Act, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/de clared-national
-emergencies-under-national-emergencies-act [https://perma.cc/U88T-Q6J5] (Jan. 26, 2021).
136
See Cantu, supra note 129, at 4, 30–31, 46–47 (providing examples of when the legislature and the judiciary have constrained the executive).
134
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realm in which constraints are largely absent and the limits on government as we
know it depend, in large part, on a choice by the President whether to abide by them
or not. This netherworld is the world of the “national emergency.” The following
discussion rests heavily on a study by the Brennan Center for Justice, which found
136 provisions in federal law, as of 2019, that bestowed extra powers on the President in the event of a national emergency.137
The Constitution’s drafters and the Supreme Court that has interpreted it over
time were intentional about omitting a specific power in the executive branch to deal
with emergencies.138 Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson famously attributed to
the framers the suspicion that “emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies.”139 But Congress has filled the breach by passing numerous laws allowing the
President to act either under a broad declaration of a national emergency, which
triggers powers located in dozens of other statutes,140 or by making some specific
factual finding that triggers a particular power to respond to the condition that the
President has found to be true.141 While it is difficult to get a perfectly accurate and
up-to-date count, the Brennan Center reports forty presidential emergency declarations under the National Emergencies Act of 1976 that are currently in effect.142
One recent such emergency declaration has been prolific in sprouting litigation
and provides an illuminating illustration of the way that direct delegation evades
meaningful constraint. After Congress declined to vote for the full appropriation that
President Trump requested to support the building of a border wall, the President
declared a national emergency regarding the southern border of the United States,
pursuant to his authority under the National Emergencies Act.143 That declaration,
in turn, triggered a second delegation under 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a), which provides that
“[i]n the event of . . . the declaration . . . of a national emergency . . . that requires
use of the armed forces, the Secretary of Defense . . . may undertake military
construction projects . . . that are necessary to support such use of the armed
137

A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://www
.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guide-emergency-powers-and-their-use
[https://perma.cc/UK7B-X7JY] (Apr. 24, 2020).
138
Of course, the powers to declare war, suspend habeas corpus “when . . . the public safety
may require it,” and calling forth the militia to suppress rebellions were all given to Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8–9.
139
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 650
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
140
The two general emergency statutes commonly used by Presidents to confer power are
the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–51, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–06.
141
See §§ 1601–51.
142
Declared National Emergencies Under the National Emergencies Act, supra note 135
(counting national emergencies through Dec. 17, 2020).
143
See Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019); EMILY E. ROBERTS,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10252, DECLARATIONS UNDER THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT,
PART 1: DECLARATIONS CURRENTLY IN EFFECT 1 (2019).
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forces.”144 The President then invoked this power in directing the Secretary of the
Treasury to reallocate funds to support the wall, in cooperation with the Departments
of Defense and Homeland Security.145 This decision was challenged in court by
several different plaintiffs, under several theories.146
Only one of the cases directly challenged the President’s exercise of his statutorily
delegated authority to declare a national emergency.147 The government responded
that there is no judicial review of national emergency declarations, and the trial court
never reached this argument.148 It was almost a throwaway argument, to attack the
beginning of the causal chain with the President’s national emergency declaration,
with little hope that the court would credit it. The vast majority of argument in all
three cases focused rather on claims that actions of the executive branch as a whole—
aimed principally at the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and the Treasury—were in conflict with other statutes, in violation of the constitutional power
of appropriation of Congress, or taken in violation of the APA.149 While there are
petitions for certiorari pending in these cases, the questions presented do not even
mention a possible attack on the direct delegation to the President.150 It is perhaps fortunate here that the President needed to enlist the actions of executive departments
to implement his overall plan, which provides certain agency decision points that can
provide the occasion for some judicial review under the APA.151 But the actual finding
of the President of the existence of a national emergency is not reviewed.
Statutory delegations relating to national emergencies are a particularly salient
and perhaps alarming type of direct delegation,152 but it is important to recognize
144

10 U.S.C. § 2808(a).
See JENNIFER K. ELSEA & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45908, LEGAL AUTHORITY TO REPURPOSE FUNDS FOR BORDER BARRIER CONSTRUCTION 1–2, 4–6 (2019).
146
See generally Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019), stay granted, 140
S. Ct. 1 (2019); El Paso Cnty. v. Trump, 408 F. Supp. 3d 840 (W.D. Tex. 2019), petition for
cert. filed, No 20-298 (U.S. Sept. 2, 2020).
147
See El Paso Cnty., 408 F. Supp. 3d at 846.
148
The District Court held that the funding plan violated the appropriations statute Congress
had passed when it denied part of the president’s request for appropriation and specifically
prohibited the use of appropriated funds for certain related purposes. Id. at 846, 856–60.
149
See generally U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, No. 19-5176, 2020 WL
5739026, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 2020); Sierra Club, 929 F.3d 670 (focusing on the Secretary
of Defense’s statutory authority and compliance with section 8005 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act). In addition, the plaintiffs attacked the National Emergencies Act as
unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine. See El Paso Cnty., 408 F. Supp. 3d at 850.
The court did not reach this claim. See generally id.
150
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *1, El Paso Cnty. v. Trump, No. 20-298
(U.S. Sept. 2, 2020) (indicating that there are only two questions on appeal and neither of those
questions address delegation to the President).
151
See, e.g., Mnuchin, 2020 WL 5739026, at *1 (showing that by using the Departments
of Defense, the Interior, the Treasury, and Homeland Security, parts of the President’s plan
became subject to review under the APA).
152
See A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, supra note 137 (pointing out the
145
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that there are numerous other provisions in the U.S. Code that delegate to the President
the power to do something upon finding that a particular condition is satisfied.153 For
example, the Immigration and Nationality Act is a delegation of power conditioned
upon a presidential finding that “the entry of any aliens . . . into the United States
would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”154 The President invoked
this power under § 1182(f) to support a Proclamation restricting entry into this
country of persons from eight named countries, known as the Travel Ban.155 The
Proclamation was challenged on several grounds; exercise or abuse of a power that
violates the nondelegation doctrine was not one of them.156
The Court did not consider the possibility that this sweeping authority, which
gives no indication of what the “interests of the United States” are or what kind of
showing should accompany a finding that a person’s entry is “detrimental” to it, might
be an improper delegation.157 Rather, it upheld the Proclamation on the ground that
“[b]y its terms, § 1182(f) exudes deference to the President in every clause.”158 Indeed,
by reading the statute as broadly as it did on the merits, the Court’s analysis actually
intensifies the principal concern underlying the nondelegation doctrine—that Congress
may authorize, and a President may employ, unbounded discretion to make policy
with no guidance or accountability.159
Thus, to the challengers’ claim that the Proclamation failed to “provide a persuasive rationale” for excluding the named nationalities from entry, the Court offered
particularly alarming potential of some of the emergency powers statutes, such as one that
“would allow the president to suspend a law that prohibits government testing of chemical
and biological agents on unwitting human subjects”).
153
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (illustrating a scenario in which the President receives the
power to act if a particular condition is met).
154
Id.
155
See Dara Lind, Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Trump’s Travel Ban, VOX (June 26,
2018, 10:24 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/26/17492410/travel-muslim-ban-supreme-court
-ruling (explaining how Trump’s use of § 1182(f) was determinative for the Court majority
in upholding the Trump Travel Ban against eight countries).
156
See generally Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). The claims brought before the
Supreme Court were whether the Court has the power to review the challenge to the Proclamation, whether the Proclamation exceeds the President’s authority under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, whether it discriminates on the basis of nationality in violation of that same
statute, whether it violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, and whether the scope
of the injunction issued below was proper. Brief for Respondents at i, Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).
157
See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2408 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)) (explaining that the Court
found the Proclamation to be within the comprehensive delegation, but giving no suggestion
that the delegation may have been problematic).
158
Id.
159
See id. By contrast, courts usually vindicate the constitutional principles of due process
and separation of powers “by narrowly construing grants of policy-making power.” Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 470 (1989).
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a consequential retort.160 “Such arguments are grounded on the premise that [the
statute] not only requires the President to make a finding . . . but also to explain that
finding with sufficient detail to enable judicial review. That premise is questionable.”161 The Court’s stunning statement is, in effect, a rejection of the entire premise
of the nondelegation doctrine itself, as well as that of the APA, that the rule of law is
best served when acts of delegated authority are accompanied by guidance and reasons
to show that the policies originating in Congress are being fulfilled in the executive
branch. The Court expressly declined to consider whether the President’s action was
beyond the power of judicial review on other grounds suggested by the government.162
But, even while purporting to exercise judicial review, the Court cemented bricks
onto the fortress of presidential imperviousness to judicial oversight by according
the utmost deference to the actions on the merits.163 It requested no justification at
all in support of the President’s finding that the entry of the targeted travelers would
be detrimental to the United States.164 Importantly, the Court accorded this massive
deference despite claims of significant individual rights at stake in the case.165
In light of the argument put forward in this Article, it should come as no surprise
that there is a plausible claim that the statute under which the President acted is an
excessively broad delegation that would be invalidated under any meaningful nondelegation doctrine applied to direct delegations. The delegation (unreviewable under
a toothless nondelegation doctrine) produced a presidential finding (unreviewable
under a vague barrier), which then gave rise to significant deference based on the
breadth of the statutory language.166 This is a house of cards to support the deference. Ilya Somin has, indeed, suggested that the very breadth in the statute that the
majority used to support its deferential posture toward the President also makes the
statute unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine.167 Looking at the Court’s
most recent discussion of that doctrine, he shows that even the plurality opinion in
Gundy—which upholds a statute as against a nondelegation challenge—made clear
that the statute at issue there would have been vulnerable to such a challenge if the
Court had not narrowed it to avoid giving the President “unguided and unchecked
160

Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2409.
Id.
162
Id. at 2407. The President argued that the entire claim was nonjusticiable on the ground
of consular immunity. Id. But the same question might apply to the lack of a basis for judicial
review.
163
See id. at 2409 (explaining that “a searching inquiry into the persuasiveness of the President’s justifications is inconsistent with the broad statutory text” and traditional deference
to the President).
164
See id.
165
See id. at 2406 (discussing the plaintiff’s claims that the Proclamation violated the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause because it was motivated by religious animus).
166
See id. at 2409.
167
Ilya Somin, A Nondelegation Challenge to Trump’s Travel Bans, REASON:VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Feb. 17, 2020, 4:27 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/02/17/a-nondelega
tion-challenge-to-trumps-travel-bans/.
161
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authority” to decide what class of persons would be subject to a criminal offense.168
Indeed, instead of narrowing the statute at issue in the Travel Ban case, by contrast,
the Court gave it “virtually unlimited discretion,”169 which might be viewed as beyond
the outer bounds of any meaningful nondelegation doctrine. While one might argue
that the area of immigration is one in which Congress’s powers are especially
strong,170 that could also be used as a reason why Congress should be very clear and
careful about giving it away to the executive without limiting guidance. The Constitution is clear that the power over immigration belongs to Congress.171
A final example is worth mentioning. The Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) was passed by Congress in the immediate aftermath of the events of
September 11th.172 It provided, in relevant part: “That the President is authorized to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001.”173 This authorization is an example of a delegation
of power, based on Congress’s power to declare war, which is conditional upon the
President’s own finding that certain entities had connections to the September 11th
attack.174 Even if that finding is unreasonable, there is no opportunity for judicial
assessment of the President’s claims.175 And there is no obvious time limit to the
authority granted in the AUMF.176
168

Id. (quoting Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (plurality opinion)).
Id.
170
An argument of this nature was raised by Josh Blackman. Josh Blackman, The Travel
Ban, Article II, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, LAWFARE (Feb. 22, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/travel-ban-article-ii-and-nondelegation-doctrine [https://perma.cc/JN
5X-3Y8W].
171
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (discussing the powers of Congress, including its authority
over the naturalization process). Blackman relies heavily on a Red-Scare-era case purporting
to recognize an “inherent” power in the Executive over immigration, United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, suggesting that perhaps the President did not even need a statute to
support its Proclamation. See Blackman, supra note 170 (arguing that the proper reading of
Knauff would allow the President to exclude immigrants regardless of whether Congress
delegated the power). Suffice it to say for present purposes that the existence of an inherent
immigration power in the President, independent of what is given to him by Congress, is controversial. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 617 (4th Cir.) (en
banc) (Wynn, J., concurring) (describing that reading of Knauff as incorrect), vacated, 138
S. Ct. 353 (2017).
172
Charlie Savage, Will Congress Ever Limit the Forever-Expanding 9/11 War?, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/us/politics/aumf-congress
-niger.html [https://perma.cc/KV7J-GMRH].
173
50 U.S.C. § 1541(2)(a).
174
See § 1541(2)(a)–(b) (declaring “that this section is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization” for the President to act).
175
See § 1541(2)(b)(1)–(2) (discussing the direct statutory authorization of presidential
action without explicitly creating any means for review).
176
See § 1541(1)–(2) (delegating specific statutory authorization to the President without
setting any clear termination date or time limitation to the authorization).
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According to the Congressional Research Service, there have been forty-one
reports of military operations in ten countries by the first three Presidents who have
served since the passage of the AUMF, including against groups that did not exist
in 2001.177 This list does not include other, non-military efforts that have been
justified on the basis of the AUMF, such as the defense of a warrantless wiretapping
program by the Bush administration.178 President Trump’s spokespersons have, more
recently, implied that the AUMF supplies authority for him to start a war with Iran,
despite the fact that the commitments of the government of Iran are antagonistic to
those responsible for the September 11th attacks.179
III. THE PERFECT STORM
This Article has called attention to a patchwork of doctrines that have been in
existence, and discussed in literature, for some time. But their message, in combination, may be newly significant: that the important values of accountability, individual rights, and rule of law—the values that Justice Gorsuch recently argued are at
the heart of the nondelegation doctrine in a somewhat different context180—have come
to have no real protector in the law when the President is authorized to determine
the factual predicates of his own authority with no external check. Courts would
prefer to stay out of matters surrounding the allocation of authority between Congress
and the President unless they absolutely have to do so. 181 When they do intervene,
they often resort to deference even where theory would call for more exacting
scrutiny.182 As we have grown increasingly accustomed to broad delegations, reliance
on congressional authorization as the way to shape executive power has blunted
judicial vigilance, and executive power has inevitably continued to grow. Voices from
the most respected quarters look to congressional action to validate the actions of
the executive branch. Justice Jackson’s famous classification from Youngstown places
the actions of the executive, when taken pursuant to congressional directive, in an
almost unassailable position—even when individual rights are impinged.183
177
See MATTHEW WEED, CONG. RES. SERV., 7-5700, PRESIDENTIAL REFERENCES TO THE
2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN PUBLICLY AVAILABLE EXECUTIVE
ACTIONS AND REPORTS TO CONGRESS 1, 5–40 (2018).
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See GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V.
TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 415 (8th ed. 2018).
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See Eliana Johnson, Trump Prepares to Bypass Congress to Take on Iran, POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/18/trump-congress-iran-1366756 [https://perma.cc
/9793-W4RW] (June 18, 2019, 8:40 AM) (quoting sources both laying groundwork for invocation of the authorization for the use of military force and denying its legitimacy).
180
See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133–35 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice,
and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1109–10 (2013) (stating that courts regularly
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See id. at 1111 (discussing a pattern of deference in judicial review for presidential
actions).
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All of this happens against a backdrop in which all incentives are on Congress
to delegate broadly and without specificity or scrutiny.184 And the movement of the
Court has been away from serious oversight.185 “This edifice of extraordinary
powers has historically rested on the assumption that the president will act in the
country’s best interest when using them. With a handful of noteworthy exceptions,
this assumption has held up.”186
It is becoming more and more common, however, for Presidents to claim unilateral authority to do what they want to do, in the absence of—or even in spite of—
statutes relevant to their action.187 And with increased polarization in Congress, there
is little or no hope of thoughtful constraint originating from the legislative branch.
As the two elected branches veer toward a merging that threatens the very idea of
limited government, political responses are constantly in the air. But there is also a
constitutional response, an arrow that is already lying within the quiver of the judiciary,
with a long history in precedent and democratic theory to support it: the nondelegation
doctrine. However, it must be a nondelegation doctrine of a different stripe.
We have long known that concerns about the delegation of power to the executive branch are grounded in the separation of powers but following a different
genealogical branch from the issues that are typically resolved by considering
whether one branch has aggrandized itself or encroached on the turf of a coordinate
branch.188 Instead, the Court has recognized that the problem of delegation, while
stemming from separated powers, is assessed by whether it has been accompanied
by sufficient standards.189
635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that when Congress authorizes the President to act
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blocked an attempt to drastically change an Obama-era executive order that would overhaul
immigration without congressional consent); Johnson, supra note 179 (commenting on the
Trump administration belief that they did not need congressional approval to take military
action against Iran).
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It is time for meaningful judicial review of the scope and execution of delegations from the Congress to the President, particularly when these delegations impinge
on important interests, especially individual rights. A revival of the nondelegation
doctrine by itself, however, would not achieve the solution that is needed. It could
drive a helpful wedge between those who wish to delegate and those who wish to
receive unlimited power and provide incentives for Congress to act with more
precision to avoid having their delegations invalidated. The remedy for an excessive
delegation, however, is striking down the offending statute. While a regime of enforcement could eventually lead to fewer broad delegations on the books, it does not
aim its ammunition at the manner in which the President carries out the delegated
authority, which is at the heart of the issue addressed here. It is unlikely that any such
rule would significantly inhibit Congress from delegating power or from providing for
a future contingency that it cannot spell out with specificity in advance. Congress
cannot be expected to anticipate with precision exactly what findings will be needed
to equip a President acting in good faith to respond to the vicissitudes of fortune.
The nondelegation doctrine, even if reinvigorated, therefore, is not alone sufficient
to solve the problem of how the President exercises discretion granted by Congress.
The nondelegation doctrine allows the Court to speak to Congress regarding its
vague guidance, but it does not extend to supervising the President in the exercise
of his delegated authority.190 But it can inspire a solution.
The concern—as it has always been—is with the arbitrary exercise of power,191
and the mechanism to provide the foundations of meaningful judicial review. What
is needed is a means for preventing a President, for example, from fabricating or
exaggerating a national emergency in order to achieve increased power to do something
otherwise not within his or her powers. Thus it is time for the Court to reconsider
its reluctance to affirm the age-old connection between separation of powers and due
process. Separation of powers has given rise to a hesitation that courts feel when
(1935) (finding the Act to be an unconstitutional delegation of power because the standards
were too broad and allowed too much executive discretion).
190
See, e.g., id. (phrasing the issue as an unconstitutional delegation of congressional
power and indicating that Congress was not thorough enough with their standards). The decision
makes no mention of how an executive branch action could have changed the nature of the
delegation. See generally id.
191
Both the legislative veto and the line-item veto cases illustrate a concern for arbitrariness,
even though the Court in those two cases chose to fashion them as separation of powers cases.
See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436, 438, 448 (1998) (arguing that the lineitem veto is unconstitutional because it overrides the procedural powers provided by the Constitution); Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951–55, 959 (1983) (finding
that the one-House legislative veto is unconstitutional as it takes constitutionally granted
power away from the Senate and President). A plausible explanation of the Court’s intuitions
in these cases is that vetoes give Congress or the President the power to exercise them in ways
not rendered accountable by the constitutional structures, and they can be used to hurt or
favor individual interests without any kind of explanation.
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they review exercises of delegated authority by a President, in light of the Court’s sense
of its own limitations, and has led the Court to defer.192 But separation of powers
should not be read to overcome the essential value of due process, which lies at the
other end of the delegation, the execution. Rather, the two foundational constitutional principles of separated powers and due process are meant to complement each
other as a means of protection against arbitrariness.193 In modern times that have
seen an explosion of delegations,194 courts have become increasingly aware that
review for abuse of discretion or arbitrariness in the execution of delegated authority
has been critical to the acceptance of agencies in the constitutional scheme. There
is simply no justification for exempting actions undertaken by the President alone
from a regime of accountability for the exercise of delegated authority.
Making this type of presidential action subject to judicial review for abuse of
discretion brings this significant bundle of government decision-making into line
with the robust administrative state, while reining in a growing source of arbitrariness
in our law that threatens liberty.195 On both sides of the ideological divide, Justices
could find common ground in the risks to liberty that excessive delegation brings,
as Justice Gorsuch warned. But they need not shut down delegation altogether in
order to make a meaningful inroad into the problem. Rather, they should acknowledge that the problem results from a confluence of delegation and execution—too
much given and too much taken. The Court’s own path of deference to presidential
findings is a big contributor to the problem of arbitrariness, and so they can attack
the problem from that side. They should dust off the classic tool of due process
review and unleash its protections against presidential arbitrariness. After all, the
President may “have an Article II,”196 but the courts can go one better by pulling out
their trusty Article III.
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